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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effects of endogenous lifetime on the relationship between 
intergenerational mobility and economic development in an overlapping generations framework. 
We assume that an individual’s lifetime depends on health status, which improves with economic 
development. Increase in lifetime encourages incentives of education investment while 
decreasing transfer, which is the funding source for education. The dynamics of intergenerational 
mobility and income inequality depend crucially on lifetime. If an increase in lifetime with 
economic development is sufficiently small, the mobility monotonically increases while income 
inequality decreases. However, if lifetime increases rapidly with economic development, the 
mobility and income inequality exhibit cyclical, and even chaotic behavior. In fact, these various 
patterns of intergenerational mobility have been observed in developed countries. 
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1. Introduction 
This study analyzes the effects of lifetime on intergenerational mobility and economic 
development and shows their interactions. As has been indicated by many studies and historical 
data, economic development decreases mortality by improving nutrition and sanitation. In fact, 
over the past few decades, developed countries have experienced a dramatic increase in lifetime 
with economic development. Similarly, mortality rate or lifetime is general important in 
determining economic growth. Many previous studies have analyzed the relationship between 
lifetime (or mortality) and economic development (e.g., see Galor and Moav 2002; Chakraborty 
2004, 2005; Chakraborty and Das 2005; Miyazawa 2006; Chen 2010; Varvarigos and Zakaria 
2013).1 
Intergenerational mobility is also closely related to economic development since it leads 
to an increase in high-income or well-educated workers. The increase in the educated workforce 
implies that the economy has a large stock of human capital and, therefore, witnesses high growth 
and an increase in its workers’ lifetime. Increase in lifetime affects the mobility and economic 
development through changes in household economic behavior, such as an increase in savings 
and a decrease in educational investment on children. Thus, lifetime, intergenerational mobility, 
and economic development have a high degree of interdependence. Lifetime is expected to play 
a crucial role in intergenerational mobility and income inequality if they are considered in the 
context of economic growth. 2  However, previous theoretical studies have overlooked it. 
Shedding light on the role of inequality in intergenerational mobility, the seminal work by Maoz 
and Moav (1999) provides a simple, but useful framework to analyze the relationship between 
income inequality and intergenerational mobility. They show that the economy monotonically 
approaches the steady state with a decrease in the wage inequality between the educated and 
uneducated. As Nakamura and Murayama (2011) point out, however, the monotonic behavior of 
both mobility and inequality depends crucially on the specific education cost function. 
Introducing a more general cost function, Nakamura and Murayama (2011) show that different 
 
1 The effects of lifetime on economic development have also been analyzed by Bhattacharya and Qiano 
(2007), Kunze (2014), Yakita (2001), and Zhang et al. (2001). In addition, Cigno (1998), Strulik (2004), 
Azarnert (2006), and Fioroni (2010) analyze the effect of child mortality on economic growth. 
2 In fact, demographic variables, such as fertility and lifetime, have a significant impact on the mobility 
and income inequality. Aso and Nakamura (2019) show that the fertility difference between the educated 
and uneducated plays a crucial role in the transitional dynamics of mobility. 
dynamics of intergenerational mobility and inequality can emerge. Galor and Tsiddon (1997) 
analyze the effect of technological progress on mobility, income inequality, and economic growth. 
Iyigun (1999) and Davies et al. (2005), among others, discuss that the type of education system—
public or private—is an important factor in determining upward-mobility. Fan and Zhang (2013) 
show the economy converges to a unique equilibrium under the private education system while 
multiple equilibria may exist under the public education system. As Owen and Weil (1999) also 
points out, parental support or self-financing, with or without a liquidity constraint, is also an 
issue to be analyzed. Galor and Zeira (1993) focus on the imperfect capital market. They show 
upward mobility is hindered by high borrowing costs; as a result, multiple equilibria emerge in 
the economy. Using the Maoz and Moav model, Murayama (2019) analyzes how government 
transfers affect intergenerational mobility and growth. He shows that larger transfers to children 
with higher ability foster upward mobility and growth if the economy has low income inequality. 
 Many previous studies on intergenerational mobility focus on the education cost, 
education system, technology, and fiscal policy, while do not account for the effects of population 
dynamics on the mobility and income inequality. However, the demographic variable plays 
important role in intergenerational mobility (e.g. Aso and Nakamura; 2019). We study the effects 
on intergenerational mobility, income inequality, and economic development incorporating 
endogenous lifetime into the model of Maoz and Moav (1999).3 As in Chen (2010), we assume 
that an individual’s surviving rate depends on health status, which improves with economic 
development. We show that the transitional dynamics of intergenerational mobility and income 
inequality depend on lifetime and the average wage share of education cost. Within our framework, 
increase in (endogenous) lifetime with economic development encourages incentives for 
educational investment, while decreasing the transfer that is the funding source for acquiring 
education. On the other hand, as the economy develops, the average wage increases more than 
education cost and therefore the average wage share of education cost decreases with economic 
development. This decrease in education cost share with economic development allow facilitates 
upward-mobility, which implies that more people acquire an education. If the increase in lifetime 
 
3 Maoz and Moav (1999) analyze the transitional dynamics of intergenerational mobility, income 
inequality and economic development in simple framework. Thus, we can clearly show the effects of 
endogenous lifetime on the transitional dynamics of mobility, income inequality and economic 
development by incorporating it into Maoz and Moav (1999). 
is sufficiently small and therefore the effect of decreasing education cost share is dominant, then 
the mobility and income inequality monotonically converge toward steady state, as in Maoz and 
Moav (1999). In contrast, if lifetime rapidly increases and therefore the effect of increasing 
lifetime is dominant, then the mobility and income inequality exhibit cyclical behavior and even 
chaos in the economy. This cyclical motion is not shown in Maoz and Moav (1999). In other 
words, they do not account for lifetime, so only the monotonous motion of mobility appears in 
their model. As a result, this paper shows that intergenerational mobility and income inequality 
depend crucially on lifetime. 
 In fact, various patterns of intergenerational mobility have been observed in developed 
countries. While Jin et al. (2019) find that mobility has non-monotonically changed in China, 
Bratberg et al. (2007) show the mobility has monotonically increased in Norway. China’s life 
expectancy rose far more rapidly than that of Norway. Between 1960 and 2015, life expectancy 
increased from 42.4 to 74.6 in China, while Norway’s life expectancy increased from 71.4 to 80.5 
(Source: OECD Health Statistics 2019). Using simple but useful framework, hence, this paper 
indicates that one of the causes of various motions of the mobility that have been observed in 
developed countries may be the increase in lifetime. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 
analyzes the transitional dynamics of the economy. Section 4 examines the transitional dynamics 
of the economy using numerical analysis. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. The model 
The model is based on incorporating endogenous lifetime in Moaz and Moav (1999).4 Consider 
the competitive equilibrium of an overlapping generations economy with a constant population 
that is normalized to one. Each individual lives potentially for three periods, that is, “childhood”, 
“young adulthood,” and “old adulthood.” While most individuals live during the second period, 
survival into old adulthood is uncertain and depends on health status. 
 
 
4 Although our model is based on Maoz and Moav (1999), it includes the probability of surviving from 
young adulthood to old adulthood therefore, it can analyze the intertemporal utility maximization 
problem. As shown later, changes in household economic behavior with increase in lifetime play an 
important role in the dynamics of an economy. 
2.1 Production and factor prices 
Following Owen and Weil (1999), we assume that aggregate output in period 𝑡 is characterized 
by the following production function.  
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐸𝑡(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)𝑈𝑡(1−𝛼)𝛽 , 𝐴 > 0, 0 < 𝛼 < 1, 0 < 𝛽 < 1, (1) 
where 𝐾𝑡 is the physical capital, 𝐸𝑡 is the number of educated workers, and 𝑈𝑡 is the number 
of uneducated workers. The total number of workers is normalized to unity and each supplies one 
unit of labor. Then, 𝐸𝑡 + 𝑈𝑡 = 1; therefore, the above production function can be written as 𝑌𝑡 =𝐴𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐸𝑡(1−𝛼)(1−𝛽)(1 − 𝐸𝑡)(1−𝛼)𝛽. 
 To focus on human capital accumulation, as with Owen and Weil (1999), we assume 
that this model economy has a small, open capital market, despite labor not being internationally 
mobile. Hence, the marginal product of physical capital is determined by the world interest rate ?̅?. Assuming that each factor receives its product in the equilibrium, the returns to an educated 
and uneducated worker in period 𝑡 are, respectively, 
 𝑤𝑡𝑒 = (1 − 𝛽)Θ𝐴(1 − 𝐸𝑡𝐸𝑡 )𝛽 , (2) 
 𝑤𝑡𝑢 = 𝛽Θ𝐴 (1 − 𝐸𝑡𝐸𝑡 )𝛽−1, (3) 
where Θ = (1 − 𝛼)(𝛼 ?̅?⁄ )𝛼 1−𝛼⁄ ; the subscripts 𝑒 and 𝑢 denote “educated” and “uneducated,” 
respectively. Hence, the wage inequality becomes: 
 
𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑡𝑢 = 1 − 𝛽𝛽 (1 − 𝐸𝑡𝐸𝑡 ). (4) 
To ensure that 𝑤𝑡𝑒 > 𝑤𝑡𝑢, we assume that 𝐸𝑡 < 1 − 𝛽. 
 
2.2 Individuals 
As a child, who does not work, the individual receives a transfer from her parent. It is used for 
consumption and possible education. When young, she works, and divides her income between 
consumption, savings, and a transfer to her children, regardless of the survival status during old 
age.5 She faces a survival probability from young to old adulthood. If she survives to old age, she 
retires and only consumes. 
The preference of individual 𝑖, born in period 𝑡, is expressed by the following expected 
lifetime utility function: 
 𝑣𝑡𝑖 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝜋𝑡+1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 , (5) 
 
5 The modeling of transfer follows Zhang et al. (2001) and Kunze (2014). 
where 𝑖 ∈ {𝑒, 𝑢}; 𝑐𝑡𝑖 is consumption in period 𝑡, 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖  is consumption in period 𝑡 + 1, 𝑥𝑡+1𝑖  
is the transfer per child in period 𝑡 + 1, 𝜋𝑡+1 is the survival probability in period 𝑡 + 1 and 𝑐𝑡+2𝑖  is consumption in period 𝑡 + 2. 
 Let ℎ𝑡𝑖  denote the education cost of individual 𝑖, born in period 𝑡. As with Maoz and 
Moav (1999), we assume an imperfect capital market that a child cannot access. Hence, individual 
uses up all the transfers from parents during childhood. A surviving individual will receive not 
only own her past savings plus interest, but also the return from mutual funds since we assume a 
perfect annuities market in line with Chakraborty (2004) and Fanti and Gori (2014). Thus, if she 
acquires education, her budget constraints are 
 𝑐𝑡𝑖 + ℎ𝑡𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡𝑖; (6.a) 
 𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 = 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑠𝑡+1𝑖 ; and (6.b) 
 
𝑅𝜋𝑡+1 𝑠𝑡+1𝑖 = 𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 , (6.c) 
where 𝑅 = 1 + ?̅?. If she does not acquire education, her budget constraints become 
 𝑐𝑡𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡𝑖; (7a) 
 𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 = 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑠𝑡+1𝑖 ; and (7.b) 
 
𝑅𝜋𝑡+1 𝑠𝑡+1𝑖 = 𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 . (7.c) 
Since we assume an imperfect capital market, the utility maximization problem can be solved 
backwards in two stages. First, the individual considers optimal allocation for the periods of 
adulthood. Then, the individual decides whether to acquire education in childhood. The utility 
maximization in the periods of adulthood is formulated as follows. 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 ,𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 ,𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝜋𝑡+1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 , 
 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 + 𝜋𝑡+1𝑅 𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 = 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 , 
The optimal consumption, transfer in period 𝑡 + 1, and optimal consumption in period 𝑡 + 2 
become, respectively,  
 𝑐𝑡+1𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡+1𝑖 = 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖2 + 𝜋𝑡+1, 𝑐𝑡+2𝑖 = 𝑅 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖2 + 𝜋𝑡+1. (8) 
Hence, the indirect utility function in the periods of adulthood is: 
 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑖 ) = 2𝑙𝑜𝑔 [ 𝑤𝑡+1𝑖2 + 𝜋𝑡+1] + 𝜋𝑡+1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [ 𝑅𝑤𝑡+1𝑖2 + 𝜋𝑡+1]. (9) 
If the utility derived from investing in education is higher than or equal to the utility derived from 
not investing in education, then individual 𝑖 will acquire education. Thus, 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑥𝑡𝑖 − ℎ𝑡𝑖) + 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 ) ≥ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥𝑡𝑖 + 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 ),  
or, 
 ℎ𝑡𝑖 ≤ 𝑥𝑡𝑖 [1 − 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 )𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )] = 𝑥𝑡𝑖 [1 − (𝑤𝑡+1𝑢𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )2+𝜋𝑡+1]. (10) 
From (10), we have the following critical value of education cost ℎ̂𝑡𝑖  for individual 𝑖 : 
 ℎ̂𝑡𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡𝑖 [1 − 𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 )𝑧(𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )] = 𝑥𝑡𝑖 [1 − (𝑤𝑡+1𝑢𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )2+𝜋𝑡+1]. (11) 
 As can be seen from (11), in addition to the wage inequality 𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 𝑤𝑡+1𝑢⁄  and the 
transfer 𝑥𝑡𝑖, the surviving rate 𝜋𝑡+1 also plays an important role in education choice. The higher 
the value of 𝜋𝑡+1, the larger the incentive to acquire education. It implies that, when lifetime 
increases, the incentive of acquiring education increases since lifetime returns to education 
investment increases. Hence, an increase in 𝜋𝑡+1 encourages educational investment.6 
 Suppose that ℎ̂𝑡𝑒 (ℎ̂𝑡𝑢) is the critical value of educational cost for the individual born to 
an educated (uneducated) worker to acquire education. Then, from (11), 
 ℎ̂𝑡𝑒 = 𝑤𝑡𝑒2 + 𝜋𝑡 [1 − (𝑤𝑡+1𝑢𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )2+𝜋𝑡+1], ℎ̂𝑡𝑢 = 𝑤𝑡𝑢2 + 𝜋𝑡 [1 − (𝑤𝑡+1𝑢𝑤𝑡+1𝑒 )2+𝜋𝑡+1]. (12) 
 
2.3 Education cost among individuals 
Following Maoz and Moav (1999), the following cost is assumed to be incurred for the education 
of individual 𝑖 in period 𝑡. 
 ℎ𝑡𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖𝑐(?̅?𝑡) = 𝜃𝑖(𝑎 + 𝑏?̅?𝑡), (13) 
 
6 Hence, increase in lifetime has the “Ben-Porath effect” in our model. 
where ?̅? = 𝐸𝑡𝑤𝑡𝑒 + (1 − 𝐸𝑡)𝑤𝑡𝑢 is a weighted average of educated and uneducated wages, 𝜃𝑖 
is a parameter representing individual 𝑖′𝑠 ability to learn; the higher the ability, the lower is the 
value of 𝜃𝑖. We further assume that 𝜃𝑖 is uniformly distributed in the interval (𝜃, 𝜃), regardless 
of the ability and class of the parents in any period. Hence, ℎ𝑡𝑖  is also uniformly distributed in 
the interval (ℎ𝑡 , ℎ𝑡), where ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃(𝑎 + 𝑏?̅?𝑡) and ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃(𝑎 + 𝑏?̅?𝑡). 
 
2.4 Endogenous lifetime 
We assume that the probability of surviving 𝜋𝑡 depends on health status 𝐻𝑡; this relationship is 
represented as follows: 
 𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋(𝐻𝑡) = 𝜋 + 𝜋𝐻𝑡𝛿1 + 𝐻𝑡𝛿 , (14) 
where 𝛿 > 0 ; 0 < 𝜋 ≤ 1 ; 0 < 𝜋 < 𝜋 ; 𝜋(0) = 𝜋 > 0 ; 𝜋′(𝐻) > 0 ; 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝐻→∞ 𝜋(𝐻) = 𝜋 ≤ 1 ; 𝜋′′(𝐻) < 0 if 𝛿 ≤ 1 and 𝜋′′(𝐻) ⋛ 0, for any 𝐻 ⋚ ?̅? ≡ [(𝛿 − 1) (1 + 𝛿)⁄ ]1 𝛿⁄  if 𝛿 > 1. 
The parameter 𝛿 represents how an additional unit of health investment is transformed 
into greater longevity through health technology. If 𝛿 ≤ 1, 𝜋𝑡 is a concave function. If 𝛿 > 1, 𝜋𝑡 is a S-shaped function, that is, threshold effects exist (see Fanti and Gori, 2014). In other 
words, when 𝛿 < 1, there is a relatively slow increase in with economic development. In contrast, 
if 𝛿 > 1 , lifetime suddenly and rapidly increases with economic development owing to the 
sudden effect. An increase in 𝛿 increases the speed of converges from 𝜋 to 𝜋. In other words, 
the larger 𝛿  increases rapidly lifetime. This function from captures empirical evidences of 
Martikainen et al. (2009) and Fioroni (2010), which show that the larger thresh hold effects (the 
larger 𝛿 ) make the speed of increase in lifetime slow when 𝐻  is relatively small, while 
increasing efficiently and rapidly the speed of increase in lifetime when 𝐻 > ?̅?. 
  In addition, mortality tends to fall with economic development owing to improvement 
in nutrition and sanitation. Similar to Chen (2010), we assume that the health status 𝐻𝑡 is 
determined by economic development, i.e., per capita income 𝑦𝑡 = ?̅?𝑡 (1 − 𝛼)⁄ . 
 𝐻𝑡 = 𝐻(𝑦𝑡) = 𝜙𝑦𝑡 , 𝜙 > 0, (15) 
where 𝜙  represents health productivity. Thus, health status improves with economic 
development and therefore, lifetime also increases. 
 
 
3. Dynamics of the model 
In this section, we show the dynamics of the economy. Intergenerational mobility can be 
expressed in two ways—upward-mobility (𝑈𝑀𝑡) and downward-mobility (𝐷𝑀𝑡). In our model, 
upward-mobility means that individuals born to an uneducated parent become educated adults, 
while downward-mobility means that individuals born to an educated parent become uneducated 
adults. The dynamics of 𝐸𝑡 can therefore be expressed as: 
 𝐸𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡 = (1 − 𝐸𝑡) ℎ̂𝑡𝑢 − ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑡 − ℎ𝑡⏟          ≡𝑈𝑀𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡 ℎ𝑡 − ℎ̂𝑡
𝑒ℎ𝑡 − ℎ𝑡⏟      ≡𝐷𝑀𝑡  (16) 
or 
 𝐸𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝐸𝑡) ℎ̂𝑡𝑢 − ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑡 − ℎ𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡 ℎ̂𝑡𝑒 − ℎ𝑡ℎ𝑡 − ℎ𝑡  (17) 
Taking into account ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃𝑐(?̅?𝑡), ℎ𝑡 = 𝜃𝑐(?̅?𝑡) and Eq. (12), Eq. (17) can be written 
as follows: 
 𝐸𝑡+1 = 1[2 + 𝜋(𝑦𝑡)]⏟      (∗1) (𝜃 − 𝜃)𝑓(𝐸𝑡+1)
⏞    (∗2)𝑠(𝑤𝑡)⏟  (∗3) − 𝜃𝜃 − 𝜃, 
(18) 
where 𝑓(𝐸𝑡+1) = [1 − (𝑤𝑡+1𝑢 𝑤𝑡+1𝑒⁄ )2+𝜋𝑡+1(𝑦𝑡+1)]  and 𝑠(𝑤𝑡) = 𝑐(𝑤𝑡) 𝑤𝑡⁄   represents the 
average income share of education cost. 
 
Investigating Eq. (19), we can see the dynamic behavior of intergenerational mobility, 
inequality, and economic development. Totally differentiating Eq. (19), 
 𝐺1𝑑𝐸𝑡+1 = 𝐺2𝑑𝐸𝑡,  
where 
 𝐺1 = 1 − 1[2 + 𝜋(𝑦𝑡)](𝜃 − 𝜃)𝑓′(𝐸𝑡+1)𝑠(𝑤𝑡) , (20) 
 𝐺2 = − 𝜀𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡𝜋[2 + 𝜋(𝑦𝑡)]2(𝜃 − 𝜃) 𝑓(𝐸𝑡+1)𝑠(?̅?𝑡) 𝐸𝑡  𝜋(𝑦𝑡)⁄ ⋛ 0, (21) 
and 
 𝜀𝑡𝑠 = 𝜕𝑠(?̅?𝑡) 𝑠(?̅?𝑡)⁄𝜕𝐸𝑡 𝐸𝑡⁄ = 𝑠′(?̅?𝑡) ?̅?𝑡′  𝐸𝑡𝑠(?̅?𝑡) < 0, (22) 
 𝜀𝑡𝜋 = 𝜕𝜋(𝑦𝑡) 𝜋(𝑦𝑡)⁄𝜕𝐸𝑡 𝐸𝑡⁄ = 𝜋′(𝑦𝑡)𝑦𝑡′  𝐸𝑡𝜋(𝑦𝑡) > 0. (23) 
𝜀𝑡𝑠  and 𝜀𝑡𝜋  represent the elasticity of education cost share with respect to the share of the 
educated in period 𝑡 and the elasticity of surviving rate with respect to the share of the educated 
in period 𝑡 , respectively. An increase in surviving rate 𝜋𝑡 decreases the transfer that is the 
funding source of education investment, and, therefore, discourages intergenerational mobility. 
Unfortunately, since the sign of 𝑓′(𝐸𝑡+1) is ambiguous, the sign of 𝐺1 is also ambiguous. 
However, to see determinants of the dynamics of economy, we assume that 𝐺1 > 0 holds as 
follows. 
 Suppose that 𝐺1 > 0. As is evidently from Eqs. (20) and (21), the transitional dynamics 
of intergenerational mobility depends on 𝜀𝑡𝑠 and 𝜀𝑡𝜋. Hence, we have 
 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 [𝑑𝐸𝑡+1𝑑𝐸𝑡 ] = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 [𝐺2𝐺1] = −𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛[𝜀𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡𝜋]. (24) 
 As educated workers increases, that is, the economy grows, the education cost share 
decreases, and 𝜀𝑡𝑠 < 0. In other words, the average wage increases more than the education cost. 
This reduction in education cost share encourages the mobility. On the other hand, lifetime 
increases with economic development, and 𝜀𝑡𝜋 > 0. This increase in lifetime decreases transfer 
from parents to children caused by higher savings, and, therefore discourages mobility. If increase 
in lifetime is sufficiently small, then 𝐺2 𝐺1 = −⁄ [𝜀𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡𝜋] > 0 ; hence Eq. (18) is upwards-
sloping in the (𝐸𝑡 , 𝐸𝑡+1) plane. In contrast, if increase in lifetime is sufficiently large, then 𝐺2 𝐺1 = −⁄ [𝜀𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡𝜋] < 0; hence, Eq. (18) is downwards-sloping in the (𝐸𝑡 , 𝐸𝑡+1) plane. Thus, 
we have following proposition.7 
 
Proposition Suppose that 𝐺1 > 0. the transitional dynamics of intergenerational mobility 
depends on two effects, i.e. the positive effect of a decrease in education cost share and the 
negative effect of an increase in lifetime. When the former is dominant, that is, increase in lifetime 
is sufficiently small, the mobility and income inequality monotonically approach the steady state, 
as in Maoz and Moav (1999). In contrast, when the latter is dominant, that is, the increase in 
lifetime is sufficiently large, the mobility and income inequality exhibit cyclical behavior. 
 
 
7 If surviving rate does not depend on economic development, that is, it has an exogenous value, the 
transitional dynamics of mobility depends only on the behavior of education cost share, and, 
therefore, the mobility monotonically increases, as in Maoz and Moav (1999). 
 4. Numerical analysis 
In this section, we use numerical analysis to illustrate the Proposition. We take the parameter 
values 𝐴 = 12 , 𝛼 = 0.5 , 𝛽 = 0.5 , 𝑟 = 0.05 , 𝜃 = 5 , 𝜃 = 1 , 𝜋 = 0.95 , 𝜋 = 0.3 , and 𝜙 =0.1.8 
 Fig.1 shows the transitional dynamics of intergenerational mobility. As was shown in 
the previous subsection, the dynamics of mobility depend on both 𝜀𝑡𝑠 and 𝜀𝑡𝜋. Since increase in 
lifetime is sufficiently small, Eq. (18) is upwards-sloping in the (𝐸𝑡 , 𝐸𝑡+1) plane in Fig. 1(a). 
This implies that the positive effect of a decrease in the education cost share on mobility is larger 
than the negative effect on it of an increase in lifetime. Thus, the mobility and lifetime 
monotonically increase toward the steady state, and, therefore, income inequality decreases with 
economic development. 
 In contrast, Fig. 1 (b) shows that Eq. (18) is downwards-sloping in the (𝐸𝑡 , 𝐸𝑡+1) plane 
because the increase in lifetime is much larger than the decrease in education cost share. Hence, 
the mobility, lifetime, and income inequality monotonically approach economic development 
initially, and then exhibit cyclical behavior around the steady state. 
 This behavior of the mobility can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that the educated 𝐸𝑡 is low, and, hence, education cost and lifetime is also low. Then, as the number of those who 
are educated increases, the wage of uneducated worker increases and upward-mobility occurs. 
Hence, the educated monotonically increases with economic development owing to upward-
mobility. When 𝐸𝑡 exceeds a certain threshold, that is, economy is sufficiently developed, the 
lifetime increases rapidly. This sharp increase in lifetime increases the incentive for educational 
investment, even as it greatly decreases transfer, which is the funding source for acquiring 
education. Since this decrease in transfer is dominant, an increase in lifetime impedes mobility. 
Whether 𝐸𝑡 increases or decreases in the next period depends on the positive effect of the decline 
in education cost share and the negative effect of increase in lifetime with economic development. 
Because the latter is larger than the former, 𝐸𝑡 decreases in the next period in Fig. 1 (b); this, in 
turn, decreases the lifetime and education cost, and, therefore, 𝐸𝑡 increases in following period. 
 
8 Except for 𝐴 and 𝜙, the parameters follow Fanti and Gori (2014), Maoz and Moav (1999), and 
Owen and Weil (1999). 
This observation explains the cyclical behavior of intergenerational mobility, lifetime, and income 
inequality.  
 
Numerical Result 1 Increase in lifetime with economic development plays a crucial role 
in the transitional dynamics of mobility. If the increase in lifetime with economic development is 
quite small, the mobility approaches toward steady state, as in Moaz and Moav (1999). In contrast, 
if increase in lifetime with economic development is sufficiently large, the mobility exhibits 
cyclical behavior around the steady state. 
 
[ Insert Fig.1 about here] 
 
 In particular, if the decrease in education cost share is quite small and lifetime increases 
more suddenly and rapidly, the fluctuation is greater and even chaotic. We now show an example 
of chaotic equilibrium in Fig. 2. Since 𝛿 is greater, the lifetime increases more rapidly, and, then, 
greatly decreases the transfer. As a result, a chaotic equilibrium appears in the economy. This 
chaotic equilibrium implies that intergenerational mobility, income inequality, and economic 
growth continue to fluctuate over time. 
 
Numerical Result 2 If the decrease in education cost share is sufficiently small and 
lifetime increases rapidly, that is, the negative effect of an increase in lifetime is much larger than 
the positive effect of a decrease in the income share of education cost, the mobility, income 
inequality, and lifetime exhibit a chaotic equilibrium. 
 
[Insert Fig.2 about here] 
 
 
5. Conclusions and remarks 
Many studies and historical data indicate that lifetime has increased with economic development 
in developed countries. Increase in lifetime affects the mobility and economic development 
through changes in household economic behavior. However, previous theoretical studies on 
intergenerational mobility have overlooked this. This study shows that the effects of an increase 
in lifetime on the mobility and economic development and analyzes their interactions. 
We show that an increase in lifetime with economic development increases the incentive 
for acquiring education, and decrease in the transfer, which is the funding source for acquiring 
education. In particular, a decrease in the transfer with an increase in lifetime plays a crucial role 
in the transitional dynamics of mobility.  
 The transitional dynamics of mobility depends on two effects: the positive effect of 
decreasing education cost share and the negative effect of increasing lifetime. When the former is 
dominant, that is, an increase in lifetime is quite small, the mobility, lifetime, and income 
inequality monotonically approach the steady state with economic development, as in Maoz and 
Moav (1999). In contrast, when the latter is dominant, that is, an increase in lifetime is sufficiently 
large, the mobility, lifetime, and income inequality exhibit cyclical behavior. In particular, when 
the decrease in education cost share is quite small and lifetime increases rapidly, a chaotic 
equilibrium appears in the economy. Hence, the mobility and economic development depend on 
lifetime, and, therefore, various patterns of transitional dynamics emerge. In fact, various patterns 
of intergenerational mobility have been observed in developed countries. An increase in lifetime 
with economic development may be one of the factors generating various dynamics of the 
economy. 
 In future research, we extend the model in several ways. For example, to simplify the 
analysis and explanation, we adopt extreme assumptions regarding the capital market: imperfect, 
small, and open. Relaxing these assumptions is an issue for future study. Further, we can analyze 
the positive effect of an increase in lifetime on economic development by incorporating health 
capital into the model since health capital encourages economic development. Considering them 
in future studies will make it more interesting to explore interactions between endogenous life 
time, intergenerational mobility, and economic development. 
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(a) 𝜹 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟓, 𝜺𝒕𝒔 + 𝜺𝒕𝝅 < 𝟎 (𝑬∗ = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟕𝟖𝟎,𝝅∗ = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟒𝟐𝟗) 
(b) 𝜹 = 𝟏𝟎, 𝜺𝒕𝒔 + 𝜺𝒕𝝅 > 𝟎 (𝑬∗ = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟔𝟎𝟓,𝝅∗ = 𝟎. 𝟖𝟎𝟕𝟐) 
Fig.1 Transitional dynamics of 𝑬𝒕 𝒂 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟐,𝒃 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟓 
  
 
 
(a) Transitional dynamics of 𝑬𝒕 
(b) Fluctuations in 𝑬𝒕 and 𝝅𝒕 
 Fig.2 Chaos equilibrium 𝜹 = 𝟑𝟓; 𝒂 = 𝟎. 𝟏; 𝒃 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟖 
